Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactory in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000/2001. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward-looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of US's Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards "core" inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.
Introduction
Given the external conditions the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) was quite a success so far. When the EMU started its third stage with 11 out of 15 EU member states in January 1999, the European and US business cycle were still on an upswing. GDP growth was satisfactory, inflation was low, even some kind of convergence of the European business cycle was visible. However, the high value of the Euro at the start was not sustainable, its exchange rate against major currencies depreciated continuously. Then, in 2000, oil prices increased sharply, fuelled inflation in the industrial world and initiated a faltering of the cycle in the second half of that year, starting in the USA and followed by Europe. In 2001 (Greece became the 12 th member of Euroland), the decline continued, accelerated by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 . At the eve of the change-over from a "virtual" Euroland to a real one (the Euro is becoming legal tender as of January 2002), the world economic situation is characterized by a unique constellation: the triad (USA, EU and Japan) is in a recession simultaneously. However, whereas the USA and Japan are counteracting with an active fiscal policy, the EU and Euroland in particular are standing aside. Fiscal policy, still decentralized and in the responsibility of the EU member states has to fulfill -in a complicated co-ordination process -the targets of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which should result in a balanced budget over the cycle. Monetary policy, conducted centrally by the European Central Bank (ECB)
reacted by reducing interest rates, but more backward than forward looking and -compared to US's Fed -partly too late. So, Europe can only hope that the upswing in the USA will spill over and induce an export-led growth.
The major argument which is put forward in this paper is that the ECB's reaction to the first external shock, the oil price surge in 2000 and 2001, was not optimal. The second chapterafter a short description of the economic policy framework in EMU -discusses the two pillar strategy of the ECB and its performance so far. It questions whether really two pillars are necessary and estimates a specific Talyor rule to understand the interest-rate setting of the ECB. The implications of the oil price shock are the topic of the third chapter. It is demonstrated that this shock led to an asymmetric impact on Euroland's Member States and hence increased inflation and output dispersion. In the fourth chapter the economic outcome of an alternative monetary policy reaction to this shock is analyzed. It turns out that the overall economic performance could have been improved when targeting not headline but core inflation. Conclusions are drawn in section five.
Policy Guidelines (BEPG; see EC Treaty, Article 99(2)) as the principal and overarching policy instrument for the co-ordination of economic policies at Community level. These guidelines, which -with due respect for the independent and statutory mandate of the ECBdo not apply to monetary policy, render operational the fundamental principles of close coordination. BEPG is the pivot of the more specialized co-ordination and consultation process of multilateral surveillance (for fiscal policy -via the SGP with stability and convergence programs on the budgetary stances (debt/deficit data); employment policy -via the "Luxembourg Process" with employment guidelines and National Action Plans; micro/structural policies -via the "Cardiff Process" with multilateral review of economic reforms; macroeconomic dialogue among social partners, governments, ECB, Commissionvia the "Cologne Process"; "open method of co-ordination" -via the "Lisbon Process"
providing a more coherent setting of targets and periodic monitoring and evaluation of the results) and gives the principal policy messages. The role of monetary policy in the overall economic policy framework is somewhat unique. Although the single monetary policy represents a fundamental pillar of the system of economic governance in the euro area and the ECB is part of the overall economic policy framework there is no overall co-ordination of economic and monetary policy in EMU. There is only a structured exchange of information and views with other policy-makers (e.g. in the major co-ordination body, the Economic and Financial Committee ; see EC Treaty, Article 114(2)). However, the contacts between the independent ECB and the finance ministry are to be understood only as a non-binding open policy dialogue and should be "... in no way misunderstood as an ex ante co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy stances. In the same vein, the regular and structured dialogue between the ECB and national governments clearly excludes any ex ante policy co-ordination or joint agreements aimed at achieving a predetermined policy-mix" (ECB, 2001b, p. 64 ).
This attitude of only an informal policy dialogue may of course lead to non-optimal outcomes with respect to an overall (monetary and fiscal policy) co-ordination (see Breuss-Weber, 2001) 2 . In contrast to the US system, the EMU is missing an arrangement of fiscal federalism.
Even more, the individual responsibility of the Member States in the field of budgetary policy is explicitly underscored by the EC Treaty's "no bail-out" clause (Article 103), which value of current government liabilities. In this regime, monetary policy provides the nominal anchor, and the price level is determined in a conventional manner. Non-Ricardian regimes, by contrast, lack fiscal discipline. 2 Beetsma-Debrun (2001) investigate the circumstances under which co-ordination may be disirable. It turns out that co-ordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. Generally, the scope for fiscal co-ordination is larger under asymmetric shocks, because the ECB remains passive as average inflation in the union is unaffected.
stipulates that neither the Community nor any Member State shall be liable for the commitments of another Member State.
Two or only one pillar in ECB's monetary policy strategy?
In October and December 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB announced the main elements of its stability-oriented monetary policy strategy to the public (see ECB, 1999a (1)), and the "two pillars" of the strategy used to achieve this objective. These pillars are represented by giving money a prominent role (pillar one), as signaled by the announcement of a quantitative reference value for the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate (M3), and by a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments (pillar two) and risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole (see ECB, 1999a) .
In contrast to the Fed, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted a concrete definition for price stability: "price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area 3 of below 2%" 4 . Price stability according to his definition "is to be maintained over the medium term" (see ECB, 1999a, p. 46) . Setting a fix target has the advantage of credibility, the disadvantage is the loss of flexibility. A medium-term orientation of monetary policy ensures genuine and meaningful accountability. It implies the need for monetary policy to have a forward-looking, mediumterm orientation. It also acknowledges the existence of short-term volatility in prices, resulting 3 De Grauwe-Piskorsi (2001) investigate whether it makes a difference as far as the effectiveness of alternative loss functions of the ECB is concerned whether its policy is based on the union-wide aggregates (as is done in practice) or on the national data (on output, inflation and interest rates) of the member states. The main conclusion is that the monetary policy strategy of the ECB based on the union-wide aggregates may be a reasonable proxy of the optimal policy rule based on the national data of the member states. 4 Benigno (2001) investigates the optimal monetary policy in a currency area within the framework of a tworegion, general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. His framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that has the usual trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output. Only if the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic size of the regions (which is done when calculating the actual HICP inflation for the euro area). If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a higher degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy, in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degrees of nominal rigidity, is nearly optimal. Highest wage rigidity can be found in Spain, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland and Germany. The highest wage flexibility was measured in France, Italy and Austria (see Benigno (2001) , p. 52).
from non-monetary shocks to the price level (e.g. the result of indirect tax changes or variations in international commodity -in particular oil -prices; see ECB, 1999a, p. 47 ).
Nevertheless, as will be seen, in practice these sound arguments are mere wishful thinking. If the primary objective is satisfied, the ECB shall support the general economic policies of the EU, laid down in Article 2 of the EC Treaty (" ... to promote a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment ..."). Although there are many concepts to calculate "core" inflation (see ECB, 2001a for an overview), the most prominent and widely used method is that which extracts the most volatile components of overall ("headline") HICP inflation. Excluding unprocessed food and energy, the so defined "core" HICP inflation (see ECB, Monthly Bulletin, June 2001, p. 37) was below the ECB target of 2% (see figure 3 ) and around one percentage point lower than "headline" HICP inflation (see ECB, 2001a, p. 58) . Such or similar reflections are undertaken 6 Whereas Alesina-Blanchard-Gali-Giavazzi-Uhlig (2001, pp. 16-18 ) dismiss the Balassa-Samuelson effect (relative price increase of fast-growing (catching-up) countries -more precisely as a consequence of faster growing productivity in the tradable sector compared to the non-tradable sector of an economy) as quantitatively relevant for the inflation dispersion in Euroland, Reutter-Sinn (2000) find that as a result of the BalassaSamuelson effect relative prices change rapidly between and within the euro countries. They derive a minimum inflation rate for Euroland (compatible with the requirement that no country face a deflation) of 0.94% for EUR-11 and of 1.13% for an enlarged Euroland (EUR-21). Within EUR-11 the minimum inflation varies between 0%
by the ECB under the pretext of the "second pillar" of monetary strategy via a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments. As will be argued in this paper, the concentration on "core" instead of "headline" HICP inflation would have optimized monetary policy and resulted in a better overall economic outcome in the EU.
Before analyzing the concrete monetary policy reaction of the ECB to the first external shock (the sharp oil price increase), the importance of the "first pillar" of monetary strategy, the prominent role for money, defined as the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate to conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the euro in relation to nonCommunity currencies or to formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy; see also ECB, 2001b, pp. 57-58).
How does the ECB set interest rates?
The Governing Council of the ECB sets three kinds of interest rates: a) those for main refinancing operations, b) those for marginal lending facility (over-night money) and c) those Governors of the Federal Reserve System (in the following shortened "Fed"), the Federal Funds rate shows the following policy stance of both regions (see figure 5 ). He suggested the same weights for both coefficients )
. He also assumed that the "natural" interest rate and the inflation rate target were both equal to 2 ( )
As the ECB has as primary objective to maintain price stability, the same weights for inflation and output targeting are obviously not adequate for Euroland. Alesina-Blanchard-Gali- (1) have introduced a contractionary bias in the ECB policy, which was not the case. Further more, the ECB appears to have pursued an interest rate policy that has been more attuned to inflation developments in three countries (France, Germany, and Austria), than to those in the euro area as a whole (Alesina-Blanchard-Gali-Giavazzi-Uhlig, 2001, p. 31). Finally, AlesinaBlanchard-Gali-Giavazzi-Uhlig (2001, p. 34) try an ad hoc hybrid rule, whereby the ECB responds quite aggressively (with a coefficient as high as 2) to both core inflation and the inflation forecasts (both expressed in terms of deviations from target, and receiving equal weights; assuming a steady-state real rate of 2.5%). This rule appears to track much better the actual pattern of interest rates in EMU. It takes into consideration the transitory price increase due to the oil price development and also implies a forward-looking behavior of the ECB.
In the following the Taylor rule for ECB's behavior since 1999 is not calibrated but econometrically estimated. Two kinds of reaction functions are offered. The first is the traditional Taylor rule, defined in equation (1) In this context one could consider the interaction of the ECB and the Fed as a two-country monetary policy game where the reaction functions of both countries (central banks) depend on each other's reaction (see McKibbin-Sachs, 1991, p. 160) . In a symmetric case (when both, the USA and Euroland are assumed to be of equal size) a cooperative policy stance would lead to a better overall outcome than a noncooperative (NashCournot) policy stance: output would be higher, interest rates would be lower. In a noncooperative equilibrium, each country perceives that it can be made marginally better off by appreciating its currency and exporting inflation to the foreign country. Because both countries pursue this strategy in the symmetric case, the exchange rate does not change, but policies are overcontractionary. Considering the estimated adjusted Taylor reaction function of equation (3) and assuming that the Fed sets interest rates according to the original Taylor rule without taking the ECB action into account, one could rather think of a monetary policy game à la Stackelberg rather than of a Nash-Cournot game, seeing the Fed as the leader and the ECB the follower in monetary policy actions.
Fed's interest rate setting is reduced to four months. The estimate of the constant term amounts to a value of 1.4.
The Taylor rule of equation (3) can very well explain the actual interest rate setting of the ECB for MFO (see figure 6 ). Short-term interest rates, the unemployment rate and the debt to GDP ratio increased. Overall, the oil price shock hit the economy of Euroland adversely 9 .
The aggregate impact of the first external shock to Euroland is one aspect, but more important is the question how differently the shock affected real GDP of the Member States of the euro area (see figure 8) and those of the pre-ins area of the EU (see figure 9 ). 
A better outcome by an alternative monetary policy reaction?
What are the conclusions after the first external shock to Euroland for monetary policy? First, one could be satisfied with the actual policy reaction by the ECB. Second -and this position is preferred here -one could look for ways to optimize monetary policy. In order to mitigate the oil price shock, monetary policy could have reacted not only to total ("headline") HICP inflation but to "core" inflation. This would also be consistent with the second pillar of the "two pillar" strategy, namely to broadly analyze all price developments. By sticking only to headline inflation -because its rate already overshot the self-declared target of 2% (see figure   3 ) -monetary policy was too tight during the past two years.
How should the monetary policy stance be evaluated? In practice this is often done by many and exchange rate impacts in a country on either output (real GDP) and inflation. A ratio of X to 1 implies that a change in the exchange rate by X percent has the equivalent impact as a 100 basis point change in the interest rate. Thus the larger the ratio the weaker is the relative impact of the exchange rate. Generally, large and relatively closed economies such as the USA or Japan are thought to have ratios of around 10 to 1 and very open (small) economies around 2 or 3 to 1 (see Mayes-Virén, 2000, p. 201 
X representing all the other variables in the model that also have an impact on demand (real GDP, or inflation). The weights S w will be computed from the partial derivatives of the appropriate elements in f (or g ) including due allowance for the dynamic structure. An MCI is thus conditional on a particular model of the economy. Normally, MCIs are computed on the basis of the effects on real GDP.
Mayes-Virén (2000) suggest that the MCI for the euro area will be only 3. 10 Own simulations of a sustained 10% depreciation of the Euro vis à vis the US-Dollar with the NiGEM world macro model indicate the following result: real GDP increased by 1% in the first, by 1.2% in the second, by 1% in the third and by 0.9% in the fourth year. Inflation increased by 0.4% in the first, by 1.1% in the second, by 1.9% in the third and by 2.5% in the fourth year. Behind the sustained 10% depreciation of the euro the real effective exchange rate of the euro depreciates by 4.2% in the first, by 3% in the second, by 2.1% in the third and by 1.3% in the fourth year.
11 Dalsgaard-André-Richardson (2001) find with the OECD INTERLINK model that a sustained drop in short term and long term interest rates of 1 percentage point with fixed exchange rates leads to an increase in real GDP in the euro area of 0.4 percentage points in the first year and increasing to 0.6 percentage points in the second year and staying at that level thereafter. The transmission effects of interest rate cuts on the real economy and the price system, simulated with the NiGEM model are the higher, the longer lasting such cuts are. This is due to the forward-looking behavior of agents assumed in the model. If, e.g. the short term interest rates are cut not only over one year, but sustained over a period of seven years, real GDP increases by 0.8% in the first, by 1.3% in the second, by 1.4% in the third and by 1.3% in the fourth year. HICP inflation increases by 0.2% in the first, by 0.4% in the second, by 0.7% in the third and by 1.2% in the fourth year. 12 For an overview of the main determinants of the transmission of monetary policy to output and the different transmission channels (interest rates, exchange rates, credit and bank lending, balance-sheet), see EU (2001a, p. 58) .The numerous attempts to estimate (via empirical macroeconomic models) the extent of possible asymmetries in output and price responses to the single monetary policy across Euroland countries have not provided a consistent and robust picture of cross-country differences in monetary transmission and they are affected by methodological problems (Lucas problem). This state of affairs has revamped interest in microeconomic studies comparing economic and financial structures across countries, as they are ultimately responsible for any differences in the way monetary impulses are transmitted throughout the economy (see EU, 2001a, pp. 57-59; Clements-Kontolemis-Levy (2001) and Suardi (2001); Angeloni-Kashyap-Mojon-Terlizzese (2001) for an overview of the present status of research for Euroland). 13 Many attempts to find a "common European business cycle" have failed so far; see a recent exercise by Breitung-Candelon (2001) . Accordingly, the common cycle hypothesis is clearly rejected for U.K. (industrial production) data whereas some weak evidence for a joint cyclical pattern is found for France, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. Artis-Zhang (1999) show that the business cycle affiliation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) member countries has shifted from the United States to Germany since the formation of the ERM. In the same period, however, the United Kingdom's business cycle affiliation did not change. 14 Mihov (2001, p. 385 ) demonstrated that neither a complete symmetric transmission mechanism of monetary policy nor a complete synchronization of the business cycle is a necessary condition for the functioning of a currency union. The diversity across five EMU countries he analyzed is not uniformly larger than across US regions. In fact, the USA is more diverse than the five EMU countries. May be that not ex ante OCA criteria (the intensity of trade with other members; the correlation of domestic business cycles with other members) have to be fulfilled when entering a monetary union, but that it is enough to fulfill them ex post. Frankel-Rose (1998) favor this position. As international trade patterns and international business cycle correlations are endogenous, they conclude that countries with closer trade links trend to have more tightly correlated business cycles. Hence, they derive the "endogeneity of the OCA criteria".
In the pre-ins area of the EU, only the United Kingdom exhibited slight negative spill-overs from the interest rate cut in Euroland, a result consistent with the classical two-country Mundell-Fleming model with flexible exchange rates. The other pre-ins (Denmark, Greece and Sweden) hat effects comparable with those of Euroland average (see figure 14 ). 
Conclusions
Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactory in the first phase of EMU.
However, one may ask whether the monetary policy really was optimal. The estimated Taylor reaction function indicates that the monetary policy was rather backward than forwardlooking. On the one hand it reacted with a lag to the actions of US's Fed. On the other hand it was overly cautious as it was targeting total HICP inflation. In this paper it is argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy that targets inflation measured by total HICP was not optimal given the fact that Euroland was confronted with the first external (oil price) shock. The oil price shock led to an increase in headline inflation of over 1996Q2 1996Q3 1996Q4 1997Q1 1997Q2 1997Q3 1997Q4 1998Q1 1998Q2 1998Q3 1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q2 1999Q3 1999Q4 2000Q1 2000Q2 2000Q3 2000Q4 2001Q1 2001Q2 2001Q3 2001Q4 smoothing: -30% 1999Q2-2001Q3 actual oil price 
